INTRODUCTION
The Constitution emphatically begins with a display of supremacy, "We the people."
2 The phrase "the people" appears in several constitutional clauses and most notably, appears in five amendments within the Bill of Rights. 3 Who are "the people?" Does the phrase "the people" refer to a specific class of individuals or does it refer to all people within the United States? Does "the people" carry the same meaning throughout the Constitution or is the phrase defined differently in the context of the particular clause in which it is textually located? The uncertainty of the definition of "the people" was revisited in a recent circuit split regarding the Second Amendment. 4 The Second Amendment declares, "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." 5 This amendment is arguably the most controversial and misunderstood provision of the Bill of Rights. 6 With the more pressing questions of interpretations of the Second Amendment, the courts have not gotten around to extending consideration * J. are part of "the people" under the Second Amendment and thus, are afforded the right to keep and bear arms.
This Comment has a narrow scope as it only addresses whether non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens are considered part of "the people" under the Second Amendment. 13 This Comment will not analyze the constitutionality of statutes that regulate the right to possess firearms for non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens or the constitutional scrutiny that ought to be applied to such regulations. Also, this Comment will not attempt to address the current laws in relation to the existing gun debate. Those issues are left to others.
This Comment is broken down into four sections: (1) a brief discussion of the history of the Second Amendment, with an analysis of the scope of the District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago decisions and the influences of these holdings on the circuit split; (2) a review of Supreme Court precedent regarding the definition of "the people" within the Bills of Rights; (3) a summary of the decisions of the courts of appeals with an emphasis on the Seventh Circuit's opinion; (4) and an analysis of why the Seventh Circuit is constitutionally correct and to be preferred over the contrary decisions of the other circuits.
14

I. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
One of the most well-established and controversial American traditions is recognized in the Second Amendment, the individual right of "the people" to keep and bear arms. 15 Much of the Second Amendment scholarship raises conflicting views of who is afforded the right to bear arms, 16 and the amendment seems to have numerous faces, "each casting its gaze in a different direction." 17 The historical uncertainty continues because there is inconsistency among the courts of appeals as to who are the 13 See Defendant-Appellant's Brief and Required Short Appendix at 8, United States v. MezaRodriguez, 798 F. 3d 664 (7th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-3271), 2015 WL 636261 (writing, "The Second Amendment encompasses undocumented aliens because they are, and always have been, part of 'the people'") [hereinafter Defendant-Appellant's Brief and Required Short Appendix]. [Vol. 12:151 specific rightsholders entitled to this protection. 18 However, no matter how controversial the meaning of the Second Amendment is today, it was clear enough to the drafters of the United States Constitution that the amendment guaranteed "the people" the right to possess their private arms. 19 In fact, James Madison favored this interpretation and once assured the people that they shall not fear the new federal government because of "the advantage of being armed, which [they] possess over the people of almost every other nation." 20 The right for people to bear arms is an American tradition with deep Anglo-Saxon roots. 21 During the colonial period, American culture embraced the principle of private gun ownership. 22 Much of this tradition was brought from English values, traditions, and legal concepts. 23 In fact, as indicated by Sir William Blackstone in his Commentaries, " [t] he subjects of England are entitled . . . to the right of having and using arms for selfpreservation and defense." 24 This right was integrated in America as it was the policy of most colonies to pass laws requiring all males to possess arms and to serve in the local militia. 25 The term "militia," as used in the colonial context, should take the meaning of all able-bodied men themselves. 26 The coextensive use of the term "militia" and all able-bodied men is due to the necessity for each man to possess a firearm in order to report for duty and achieve the security of the free state. 27 As tensions developed between the British Parliament and the colonies, the First Continental Congress condemned Parliament's actions and called upon the colonists to arm themselves in defense against the British. governments. 29 Many of these state constitutions and declarations of rights explicitly ensured their people the right to keep and bear arms. 30 Beginning in 1776, one month prior to the signing of the Declaration of Independence, the state of Virginia pronounced in its state constitution, "A well regulated Militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free State." 31 Additionally, Pennsylvania's Constitution guaranteed, "That the people have a right to bear arms, for the defence of the State. . . ."
32
Recognizing the importance of individuals bearing arms, other states followed Virginia and drafted similar clauses in their state constitutions. 33 Specifically, Kentucky, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Vermont guaranteed the right to bear arms in their Bill of Rights. 34 However, state constitutions varied from declaring bearing arms as a "right" of "the people" versus calling it a "duty" of all able-bodied men to defend society. 35 In fact, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Vermont spoke of the right as a guarantee for "defense of themselves and the State."
36
The emphasis on these states adopting analogues, prior to the ratification of the Bill of Rights, provides a historical narrative that the Federal Second Amendment bestowed an individual right to keep and to bear arms. 37 The next step was the drafting of the Second Amendment to the Constitution, a document full of compromises and concessions. 38 In 1787, thirty-nine delegates, from twelve of the thirteen states, gathered to sign the newly written Constitution. 39 Initially, the politics of ratification was highly contested because a majority of Americans and states expressed opposition to the Constitution. 40 In fact, three delegates were reluctant to sign without a Bill of Rights and in particular, protested that Congress "at their pleasure may arm or disarm all or any part of the freemen of the United States." After Delaware became the first state to ratify the Constitution in December 1878, Pennsylvania followed five days later, but expressed considerable doubts at the state's ratifying convention because of the absence of a Bill of Rights.
42
After similar complaints followed from other states, James Madison and the Federalists promised to consider amendments to the Constitution during the First Congress. 43 Ultimately, in reliance on the promise, several states ratified and New Hampshire became the ninth state to ratify, which meant the United States Constitution was enacted.
44 James Madison, in a remarkable political action at the time, kept his word and presented the drafted Bill of Rights to the First Congress. 45 James Madison's drafting of the Second Amendment was particularly influenced by the ratifying state conventions that offered similar suggestions about the right to bear arms. 46 Specifically, calling upon the states to ratify the Constitution, New York offered fifty amendments and included the following, "That the People have a right to keep and bear Arms; that a well regulated Militia, including the body of the People capable of bearing Arms, is the proper, natural and safe defence of a free State." Additionally, Maryland and Virginia consolidated amendments and emphasized, "That the people have a right to keep and bear arms. . . ."
47
With these influences, the Second Amendment assimilated the following basic values: "[T]he right of the individual to possess arms, the fear of a professional army, the dependence on militias regulated by the individual states, and the control of the military by civilians." 48 The inclusion of the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights was a result of an ongoing debate over the relationship between military balance and the newly established system. 49 With this debate over the power of militias and suggestions to reform the structure of the Constitution, several states proposed provisions to protect the necessary right to bear arms proscribed in the Second Amendment. 50 Ultimately, the First Congress concluded the debate by declaring the vital importance of the individualright amendments and proposed the Second Amendment. 51 The importance The question before the Court was whether the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to nonresident aliens. 90 The Court started its analysis on the text of the Fourth Amendment and highlighted that the amendment "extends its reach only to 'the people. '" 91 Despite arguments that the framers used the phrase "the people" to "simply . . . avoid [an] awkward rhetorical redundancy," 92 the Court correctly emphasized that "the people" is a term of art that is particularly employed in select parts of the Constitution. 93 This deliberate use of "the people" contrasts with the phrases "persons" and "citizens" used in other clauses of the Constitution. 94 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265-66. 94 Id.; see Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1532-33 (writing, "The Constitution uses the words 'citizens,' 'persons,' and 'people,' and does so, presumably, for distinct, although not precisely defined purposes"); see also Moore, supra note 12, at 807 (writing, "the Bill of Rights makes no mention of citizens; instead, it focuses on persons (and specific categories of persons) and the people").
95
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274. not make this determination solely based on the fact that Mr. VerdugoUrquidez was a nonresident alien. 96 Instead, the Court employed a sufficient connections 97 test to make the determination that might place an illegal alien among "the people" of the United States. 98 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the court, concluded:
[The text of the Constitution] suggests that "the people" protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments . . . refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community.
99
Although the Court did not reach a definitive holding as to who qualified as part of "the people," 100 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion clearly states that "aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country."
101 Thus, to determine if illegal aliens are entitled to constitutional protections, courts must analyze whether the individual voluntarily entered this country and has accepted some societal obligations.
102
In concurring and dissenting opinions, the Supreme Court Justices reiterated that illegal aliens should not be categorically barred from the protections of the Bill of Rights. 103 Justice Stevens, writing a concurring opinion, recognized that aliens, who are lawfully present in the United States, are entitled to the protections of the Bill of Rights because these individuals are among "the people."
104 Additionally, while dissenting with the Court's decision, Justice Brennan wrote, "Fundamental fairness and the ideals underlying our Bill of Rights compel the conclusion that when we impose 'societal obligations,' . . . we in turn are obliged to respect certain 96 Id. 105 Justice Brennan's notion of mutuality is essential to his point and ultimately concluded, "When we tell the world that we expect all people . . . to abide by our laws, we cannot in the same breath tell the world that our law enforcement officers need not do the same . . . we cannot expect others to respect our laws until we respect our Constitution." 106 The touchstone of this case was not the question of whether the individual was a citizen, but the specific inquiry of the extent of one's connections with the United States.
107
Although Verdugo-Urquidez interpreted "the people" within the Fourth Amendment, the case is important to understanding the Seventh Circuit's decision and the opposing decisions of the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits. Specifically, emphasized by the Verdugo-Urquidez Court, the text of the Constitution suggests that the phrase "the people" used in the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments should carry the same meaning because of the similarity of the worded amendments.
109
The Supreme Court declared that it is widely understood that the First, Second and Fourth Amendments codify a pre-existing right of "the people."
110
Ratified at the same time, each of these amendments contains the phrase "the people" within its text. 114 Realizing the textual analysis of "the people" is the same 105 Id. at 284.
106
Id. at 297 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107
The Meaning(s) of "The People" in the Constitution, supra note 2, at 1078.
108
Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1536. Defendant-Appellant's Brief and Required Short Appendix, supra note 13, at 9 (quoting the U.S. CONST. amend. I). 113 Id. (quoting the U.S. CONST. amend. II). 114 Id. (quoting the U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
throughout each of the amendments, the Heller Court could not have possibly intended to reinterpret the meaning of "the people" and remove non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens from the protections of the Bill of Rights. 115 This interpretation would result in far-reaching constitutional implications of already established constitutional rights that are afforded to this class of individuals.
The Verdugo-Urquidez decision justifies why the Heller Court's holding should only be regarded as deciding the individual right versus the collective right question. 116 First, Justice Scalia, the author of the Heller decision, joined the majority opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez and must have been clearly aware that the interpretation of "the people Ultimately, courts must recognize that the phrase "the people" is a concept explicitly found in the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments, with the framers deliberately employing the limiting terminology of "citizen" in other distinct parts of the Constitution. Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1536. 117 Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1536. 122 Id. at 1536-37.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The Supreme Court has consistently found that non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens are entitled to constitutional rights. 123 Although the Seventh Circuit's decision is contrary to four other circuits, the decision is constitutionally correct as non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens are part of "the people" under the Second Amendment. 124 The decisions opposed to the Seventh Circuit are based on flawed reasoning. Specifically, the courts misconstrued the meaning of "the people" by misinterpreting Supreme Court precedent, the Bill of Rights, and historical traditions.
With a constitutional right at stake in their decisions, the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits incorrectly interpreted that illegal aliens are not part of "the people" and thus, not afforded the protections of the Second Amendment. Specifically, the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits expanded the scope of Heller by focusing on Justice Scalia's amorphous nouns and dicta used when discussing the people's individual right to bear arms. 125 Justice Scalia makes references in Heller to "all members of the political community," "all Americans," "citizens," "Americans," and "law-abiding citizens;" however, the opinion is incorrectly interpreted to suggest that Justice Scalia was reformulating and defining "the people" protected by the Second Amendment.
126
In fact, the Heller decision did not purport to define the term "the people;" instead, the Court focused on one specific question: whether the right to bear arms is an individual right to selfdefense or a collective right connected with the militia or its equivalent. Heller, 554 U.S. at 645 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Heller Court overlooked the significance of how the Framers use "the phrase" in different contexts within constitutional provisions).
See id. at 625 (Scalia, J., for the Court); see also Blair, supra note 109, at 168 (noting that Justice Scalia's opinions "reveal a pattern of similar rhetoric, in which 'citizen' does not denote anything other than a simple inhabitant of the United States"). examination of the Second Amendment" and therefore, "one should not expect it to clarify the entire field." 128 At the heart of these Second Amendment cases 129 is an issue that is broader than the mere possession of a firearm. 130 The issue is whether illegal aliens and non-U.S. citizens are afforded the right to bear arms and the right to defend themselves in their homes. 131 Ultimately, Supreme Court precedent and historical traditions established that the Second Amendment is a pre-existing right that is extended to all people, including illegal aliens and non-U.S. citizens, who have established substantial connections with the community and accepted some societal obligations.
132
A. UNITED STATES V. PORTILLO-MUNOZ -(5TH CIR. 2011)
The Fifth Circuit was the first circuit to address the question of whether unauthorized aliens are considered part of "the people" under the Second Amendment. 133 On July 10, 2010, Mr. Armando Portillo-Munoz, a Mexican native, who resided in the United States for one-year and six months, was arrested for possessing a .22 caliber handgun in Texas. 134 On the day of the arrest, Mr. Portillo-Munoz was working on a dairy farm when police responded to a call regarding an individual "spinning around" on a motorcycle with a gun in their waistband. 135 As police approached, Mr. Portillo-Munoz acknowledged using the firearm to protect the ranch's chickens from coyotes and admitted to being illegally present in the United States.
136 Subsequently, Mr. Portillo-Munoz was indicted and convicted of possessing a firearm. 137 Prior to this indictment, there were no reports that Mr. Portillo-Munoz had a prior criminal history, arrests, or encounters with immigration officials and law enforcement. Id. at 438. 135 Id.
136
137
138
Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d at 438. The court focused its analysis on Justice Scalia's numerous references in Heller of "law-abiding, responsible citizens" and "members of a political community" and concluded that "aliens who enter or remain in this country illegally and without authorization are not Americans as that word is commonly understood."
141 Despite the Heller Court specifically stating that its decision was not purporting to "clarify the entire field,"
142 the Fifth Circuit held that Heller, in fact, did formulate the meaning of "the people" within the Second Amendment.
143
In contrast, Mr. Portillo-Munoz argued, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Verdugo-Urquidez, that he had established sufficient connections with the United States to be considered part of "the people" under the Second Amendment.
144
Addressing Mr. Portillo-Munoz's argument, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that Supreme Court precedent has emphasized that the same analysis should be applied and followed to define the meaning of "the people" in the context of the Fourth Amendment, to the Second Amendment. 145 However, the Fifth Circuit, incorrectly and misguidedly, failed to analogize the Second and Fourth Amendment and concluded, "[W]e do not find that the use of 'the people' in both the Second and the Fourth Amendment mandates a holding that the two amendments cover exactly the same groups of people." 146 The court relied on the fact that the purposes of the Second and Fourth Amendment are different as the "Second Amendment grants an affirmative right to keep and bear arms, while the Fourth Amendment is at its core a protective right against abuses by the government. (1990)) (specifically explaining that "'the people' seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the Constitution," and that the phrase refers to those who are "protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments"); see also Emerson, 270 F. 3d at 227-28 (writing, "There is no evidence in the text of the Second Amendment, or any other part of the Constitution, that the words 'the people' have a different connotation within the Second Amendment than when employed elsewhere in the Constitution. In fact, the text of the Constitution, as a whole, strongly suggests that the words 'the people' have precisely the same meaning within the Second Amendment as without.").
153
Brief of Appellant, supra note 123, at 1. 154 Id. at 8. 155 Id. at 8-9. 
C. UNITED STATES V. HUITRON-GUIZAR -(10TH CIR. 2012)
Nearly one-year after the Fifth and Eighth Circuit's decisions, the Tenth Circuit was faced with the same vexing Second Amendment challenge. 163 However, the Tenth Circuit sidestepped the constitutional question of the Second Amendment 164 and reached the same conclusion by 157 Id. undergoing an intermediate scrutiny analysis. 165 In March 2011, officers executed a search warrant at Mr. Huitron-Guizar's family's home and recovered three firearms. 166 Mr. Huitron-Guizar's was a twenty-four yearold Mexican citizen, who had resided in the United States for years. 167 Subsequently, Mr. Huitron-Guizar was indicted for being an illegal alien in possession of a firearm and entered a guilty plea. 168 The long-lasting effect of this conviction was that Mr. Huitron-Guizar was to be transported to an immigration official for deportation. 169 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld the conviction of Mr. HuitronGuizar by dancing around the Second Amendment challenge of the appellant. 170 However, refraining from expanding the scope of Heller, the Tenth Circuit correctly emphasized that "aliens were not part of the calculus" of the Heller decision.
171 Specifically, the court noted that neither the Heller majority nor dissenters mention the phrases "aliens," "immigrants," or "non-citizens." 172 The court further refused to read into Heller an all-encompassing interpretation of the Second Amendment because "[this] question seems large and complicated."
173
The Tenth Circuit's decision properly recognized that Heller did not purport to clearly define the full scope of the Second Amendment.
174
Despite the Fifth Circuit's broad interpretation of Heller, the Tenth Circuit outright refuted the interpretation 175 and hesitated to infer a rule from Heller that categorically prohibited non-citizens and illegal aliens from the right to bear arms. 176 Specifically, the court noted that the use of the term "citizen" by the Heller majority was not deliberate because it would directly conflict with Verdugo-Urquidez, a case the Heller majority relied on. 177 The court emphasized that relying on the use of "citizen" in Heller "would require [this court] to hold that the same 'people' who receive Fourth Amendment protections are denied Second Amendment protections, even though both rights seem at root concerned with guarding the sanctity of the home 165 Blair, supra note 109, at 164.
166
Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d at 1165. 167 Id.
168
169
Id. 
D. UNITED STATES V. CARPIO-LEON -(4TH CIR. 2012)
The Fourth Circuit was the last circuit to wrongfully deny a class of individuals Second Amendment protections. On February 24, 2011, Immigration and Customs Enforcement arrested Nicolas Carpio-Leon, a citizen of Mexico, for possessing a .22 caliber Marlin rifle, a 9 mm HiPoint model C pistol, and ammunition following a consensual search.
182 Up until the date of the arrest, Mr. Carpio-Leon had lived in the United States for thirteen years with his three children, each of whom were born in the United States, and had no prior criminal record. 183 Subsequently, Mr. Carpio-Leon moved to dismiss the indictment as a violation of his Second Amendment right to bear arms. 184 The district court denied his motion, finding that " [Heller] undergoing a historical analysis, the court reasoned that "illegal aliens do not fall in the class of persons who are classified as law-abiding members of the political community for the purpose of defining the Second Amendment's scope." 187 The court improperly relied on the term "lawabiding, responsible citizens" 188 because Justice Scalia's amorphous references were not intended to redefine the scope of "the people" within the Second Amendment. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit went on to question how an unauthorized alien is law-abiding by characterizing their particular relationship to the United States. 189 Specifically, the court asserted, "[T]he crime of illegal entry inherently carries this additional aspect that leaves an illegal alien's status substantially unprotected by the Constitution in many respects." 190 The distinct analysis of this court is incorrect as it completely misconstrued and broadened the holding of Heller.
In contrast, Mr. Carpio-Leon disputed the government's historical analysis of the Second Amendment and argued that the "Second Amendment could not have been intended to exclude illegal aliens from its scope."
191 Mr. Carpio-Leon reasoned that "'[historical] attitudes toward immigration were the reverse of today's attitudes' and that '[c]onsidering the country's need for immigrants to settle frontier areas [,] . . . denying immigrants the right to defend themselves and their families would have been unthinkable. '" 192 Although the Fourth Circuit accurately noted that the Supreme Court was not clear on whether "the people" extended to illegal aliens, the court dismissed Mr. Carpio-Leon's historical claim because it "does not controvert the historical evidence supporting the notion that the government could disarm individuals who are not law-abiding members of the political community." 193 The Fourth Circuit overemphasized the historical discussion in Heller and misguidedly stressed that the Second Amendment exclusively and unequivocally protects lawabiding members of the political community. 194 The court then recited, "most scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear arms was tied to the concept of a virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the government could disarm 'unvirtuous citizens. '" 195 Furthermore, the court relied heavily on the significance of the illegal status of Mr. Carpio- Leon. 196 Specifically, the court emphasized Mr. Carpio-Leon's particular relationship as an illegal alien with the United States 197 and limited its analysis to a wrongful application of Heller.
198
Judge Niemeyer, writing for the court, stressed:
[W]e need not limit our analysis to the scope of the term "the people" and thereby become enmeshed in the question of whether "the people" includes illegal aliens or whether the term has the same scope in each of its constitutional uses. This is because Heller concludes, through a distinct analysis, that the core right historically protected by the Second Amendment is the right of self-defense by "lawabiding, responsible citizens" . . . [to which is a class that] illegal aliens do not belong.
199
E. UNITED STATES V. MEZA-RODRIGUEZ -(7TH CIR. 2015)
The Seventh Circuit was the most recent Circuit Court of Appeals to be confronted with the question of defining "the people" within the Second Amendment.
200 Mariano Meza-Rodriguez, a Mexican citizen, was brought to the United States when he was four or five years old and has remained in the country since that time. Id.
202
203
204
questioned Mr. Meza-Rodriguez's moral character by introducing his multiple interactions with law enforcement to allude that Mr. MezaRodriguez has not accepted the basic obligations of living in American society. 216 Ultimately, the court rejected the government's argument and emphasized that this factual inquiry of the individual would cause a caseby-case analysis that would be difficult to implement. 217 Specifically, the case-by-case analysis would subject non-citizens to the potential of losing previously held constitutional rights simply because the non-citizen or illegal immigrant began to behave in a criminal or immoral way. 218 The court emphasized that the Second Amendment is "not limited to such onagain, off-again protection."
219 Instead, the court declared that "the only question is whether the alien has developed substantial connections as a resident in this country." 220 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit then addressed the question of whether unauthorized aliens are to be considered part of "the people" for constitutional purposes.
221
Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the Seventh Circuit noted that "Plyler shows that even unauthorized aliens enjoy certain constitutional rights, and so unauthorized status (reflected in the lack of documentation) cannot support a per se exclusion from 'the people' protected by the Bill of Rights."
222
In fact, Supreme Court precedent has long recognized that unauthorized aliens and non-citizens are protected under the Bill of Rights when they have developed substantial connections with this country.
223
Although Mr. Meza-Rodriguez's behavior was not commendable, the Seventh Circuit held that he was entitled to the protections of the Second Amendment. 224 Chief Judge Wood, writing for the court, concluded:
In the post-Heller world, where it is now clear that the Second Amendment right to bear arms is no second-class entitlement, we see no principled way to carve out the 216 Id.
217
218
United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d 664, 671 (7th Cir. 2015).
219
220
221
222
Id. at 672; see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210 (writing, "Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a 'person' in any ordinary sense of that term. Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as 'persons' guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments"). Second Amendment and say that the unauthorized (or maybe all noncitizens) are excluded. No language in the Amendment supports such a conclusion, nor, as we have said, does a broader consideration of the Bill of Rights. 225 Again, this case is bigger than the cartridge that Mr. Meza-Rodriguez possessed. 226 This case is about the Seventh Circuit accurately interpreting Supreme Court precedent 227 and holding that the Second Amendment protects unauthorized aliens and non-U.S. citizens. 228 After the court held that Mr. Meza-Rodriguez could invoke the protections of the Second Amendment, the court then analyzed whether the statute was a permissible restriction on the right to bear arms.
229
IV. THE IMPACT AND ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS
With little guidance from the Supreme Court defining "the people" in the Second Amendment, 230 this Comment supports the approach utilized by the Seventh Circuit in the Meza-Rodriguez decision. There are countless individuals who work for their families, accept societal obligations, and maintain ties in the United States, but are not entitled to the constitutional protections of the Second Amendment because of their illegal status or not attaining U.S. citizenship. Making a determination based on the reasoning that simply because individuals are not citizens, they are not part of "the people" is an unwarranted intrusion on constitutional rights with farreaching implications. Specifically, the constitutional implications will render these individuals vulnerable to government violations of the Bill of Rights with no recourse.
231
Dating back to this nation's founding and continuing today, courts have struggled to clearly define the constitutional 225 Id.
226
Defendant-Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 130, at 14. 
231
See United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437, 444-45 (5th Cir. 2011) (Dennis, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting the Fifth Circuit's reasoning that unauthorized aliens are not part of the people "renders them vulnerable-to governmental intrusions on their homes and persons, as well as interference with their rights to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances-with no recourse"). [Vol. 12:151 rights and protections associated with illegal aliens and non-U.S. citizens. 232 Instead of foreclosing constitutional rights solely based on a status, courts must undergo an in-depth analysis of the specific text of the United States Constitution and the precedents set forth by the Supreme Court.
The Second Amendment has been the source of a never-ending debate that has added uncertainty and tension to the amendment's interpretation and meaning. 233 The right to bear arms is not an unlimited right 234 and courts are reluctant to grant this right to non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens because of unspecified fear and prejudice. In fact, the contrary circuits have held that individuals, who have lived here peacefully, though undocumented and illegal, are constitutionally prohibited from the protections of the right to keep and bear arms. 235 The right to protect oneself and home is a fundamental right deeply rooted in historical traditions and courts are subjecting non-U.S. Citizens and illegal aliens to the vulnerabilities of non-protection. The opposing circuits' reluctance to recognize these individuals' constitutional right is unsound and unsupported because each circuit relies on overly broad interpretations of dicta in Heller and refuses to recognize that Verdugo-Urquidez is still controlling precedent. Specifically, the reasoning of the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits is flawed because each court relies on a proposition that the Heller Court did not definitively attempt to clarify or define. Certain policy decisions may warrant prohibitions against these individuals to possess firearms, but these policy choices must not supplant the constitutional right of these individuals to keep and bear arms.
The Fifth Circuit was the first court to wrongly decide that illegal aliens are not considered part of "the people" under the Second Amendment.
236
This decision was flawed because it focused on an expanded interpretation of the Heller decision. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit incorrectly concentrated on Justice Scalia's numerous references of the different classes of individuals to imply that Heller narrowed the definition of "the people." In fact, it is well noted that Heller was primarily concerned with the question of deciding whether the Second Amendment is an individual right or a collective right, not the precise identity of "the 232 Moore, supra note 12, at 803; see also The Meaning(s) of "The People" in the Constitution, supra note 2, at 1099 (concluding, "it may be possible to view Heller as a commentary on the meaning of 'the people' in the First and Fourth Amendments, this interpretation is at odds with the Court's precedents, the Constitution's purposes, and this country's principles"). 
238 The Fifth Circuit's reliance on Justice Scalia's amorphous nouns affords too much weight to these inadvertent references 239 and thus, leads to a misguided interpretation of the meaning of "the people" in the Second Amendment. This unsupported position taken by the Fifth Circuit is misguided because it leads to a narrow interpretation that the Second Amendment proffers a citizen only right. 240 Implying that "the people" equates to "citizen" within the Second Amendment ultimately implies that the Bill of Rights is a citizen only entitlement, which is contrary to already established Supreme Court precedent.
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit's interpretation is misguided because the Supreme Court has widely recognized the different terms of art employed in the Constitution. Indeed, if the drafters intended to proffer the Bill of Rights as a citizen only right, then why not specifically use "citizen," which is explicitly employed in other distinct parts of the United States Constitution? What was most surprising of the Fifth Circuit's analysis of Heller was its acknowledgment that the Heller decision did not purport "to clarify the entire field" of the Second Amendment, 241 but then expanded the reading of Justice Scalia's noun usage to define and clarify unresolved issues. This analysis and proposition is counterintuitive and ultimately leads to an overreaching holding with neither supporting precedent nor historical foundation.
Another flaw of the Fifth Circuit's decision was its analysis of distinguishing the Second and Fourth Amendment by emphasizing that the interpretation of "the people" within each amendment should not be identical. 242 The Fifth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has held that the meaning of "the people" in the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted in the same context as the Second Amendment; however, the Fifth Circuit deviated from this precedent and created an alternative analysis by focusing between the difference of a protected right (Fourth Amendment) and an affirmative right (Second Amendment See Blair, supra note 109, at 185 (writing that this affirmative versus passive right test finds little support in precedent and is unlikely to be followed by other courts addressing this rule).
it has relied on throughout its opinion, Heller, quotes Verdugo-Urquidez's unambiguous language that "the people" protected by the Fourth Amendment, are also protected by the First and Second Amendment. 244 This selective choice of dicta and precedent leads to a flawed analysis and decision. Specifically, it is clear that the Heller Court's citing to VerdugoUrquidez strongly indicates that the Court supports and adopts this interpretation of "the people." 245 However, the Fifth Circuit failed to recognize this aspect of Heller and ultimately, deprived illegal aliens and non-U.S. citizens of the protections of the Second Amendment.
The Fifth Circuit was a divided court and the dissent clearly rejected the majority's dismissal of the Second Amendment claim. 246 The dissent supported the viewpoint of this Comment, that the Supreme Court's interpretation of "the people" in Verdugo-Urquidez is the correct analysis to be applied to the Second Amendment. 247 Although the Supreme Court has not resolved this prevailing issue, the Fifth Circuit's decision overreached and misguidedly expanded the Heller decision through its refusal to recognize the clear criteria settled in Verdugo-Urquidez-still controlling precedent.
248
The court's failure to recognize the Verdugo-Urquidez interpretation of "the people" creates a lingering threat to other constitutional rights proffered to this class of individuals. 249 This picking and choosing of rights afforded to citizens is based on arbitrary analysis that will ultimately strip away protections already afforded to non-U.S. Citizens and illegal aliens. 250 In fact, the Fifth Circuit's lack of textual support, 251 other than inadvertent nouns used by Justice Scalia in Heller, 252 supports the conclusion that the Second Amendment protections extend beyond the citizenry.
The Eighth Circuit was the next circuit to address the interpretation of "the people" and did little to clarify the analysis and interpretation set forth in the Fifth Circuit's decision. 253 The court's per curiam decision, which simply affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit, was in part due to the minimal persuasive authority of Mr. Flores' brief. Although Mr. Flores' brief utilized the substantial connection test, the brief did little to exploit the Fifth Circuit's irrational approach of expanding the scope of the Heller decision. The correct approach to challenging an incorrect interpretation of "the people" is to justify the use of the substantial connection test by emphasizing that Supreme Court precedent supports this position and Verdugo-Urquidez is still controlling authority. This is accomplished by differentiating the specific question addressed in Heller and the Second Amendment question addressed in these cases. This is where the appellant failed, which ultimately led to the Eighth Circuit's per curiam decision. However, one portion of Flores' brief warranted the court's consideration. Specifically, Mr. Flores' reiterated that it has been widely held that non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens have been afforded and are entitled to the protections of the Constitution.
254
The fact that these individuals must oblige to our legal system follows that they ought to be entitled to the extensions of the United States Constitution. 255 In fact, James Madison supported this position and declared,
[I]t does not follow, because aliens are not parties to the Constitution, as citizens are parties to it, that whilst they actually conform to it, they have no right to its protection. Aliens are not more parties to the laws, than they are parties to the Constitution; yet it will not be disputed, that as they owe, on one hand, a temporary obedience, they are entitled, in return, to their protection and advantage.
256
Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit's decision was misguided because it relied on the flawed decision of the Fifth Circuit. However, not to discredit the court, Mr. Flores' brief provided unpersuasive support for his Second Amendment claim and did little to challenge the preceding opinion of the Fifth Circuit. 257 Strong and persuasive arguments emphasize that the Heller Court's use of the word "citizen" and "law-abiding members" did not intentionally proscribe a constitutional test for the identity of "the people" See generally supra note 123 (noting Supreme Court cases discussing constitutional protections extended to illegal aliens and non-U.S. citizens). 
Id.
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See Brief of Appellant, supra note 123, at 4-10. [Vol. 12:151 under the Second Amendment. 258 The slicing and dicing of the Heller opinion is not the proper analysis to impose a restriction on the constitutional rights of non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens.
The Tenth Circuit was another court to uphold the Second Amendment ban on illegal alien's possession of firearms. The court did not specifically decide "the people" question of this Comment, but offered correct insight on how to interpret the Heller decision and the Second Amendment. 259 The Tenth Circuit's main proposition was that the Fifth and Eighth Circuits read too far in-depth into an unwritten holding of the Heller Court. 260 This is the precise point as of why the analysis is flawed in the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits. The Tenth Circuit addressed why Justice Scalia's numerous references should not be taken to scrutinize "the people." Specifically, the Tenth Circuit noted that the Heller Court also referred to the First Amendment and citizens, 261 which we surely can conclude that Justice Scalia did not establish that the First Amendment requires U.S. citizenship to speak for any purpose. 262 The Fifth and Eighth Circuits' creative reading of Heller incorrectly leads to a narrower interpretation of "the people" and essentially overrules the foundational reading of the phrase established by the Supreme Court.
263 Specifically, the VerdugoUrquidez decision laid the foundation that "people" is a term of broader content than "citizen." 
Id.
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See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (Scalia, J., opined "we do not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose") (emphasis in original).
262
Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d at 1168-69 (emphasizing, "Heller also spoke of the First Amendment rights of 'citizens,' though we know that that amendment extends in some degree to resident aliens, too"); see also After undergoing a "distinct analysis" of Heller, the Fourth Circuit emphasized the numerous nouns of Justice Scalia's opinion to declare that the Second Amendment requires a law-abiding, citizenry test to determine who is afforded the protections of the amendment. 269 This approach of expanding the Heller decision is constitutionally incorrect and the various references to "citizens" and "law-abiding members" should not be taken as a literal interpretation of "the people." However, the Fourth Circuit introduced another aspect to this debate by highlighting the title undocumented individuals hold as "illegal." 270 The Fourth Circuit emphasized the title to reflect a historical approach that limits Second Amendment rights to individuals who are lawabiding members of the community. 271 The Fourth Circuit cites persuasive authority for its position that this right correlates with law-abiding individuals, but it fails to persuasively distinguish a law-abiding individual to someone who could be law-abiding, but merely entered the country illegally. 272 Specifically, an individual can be a law-abiding, undocumented member of this country; however, the Fourth Circuit's test of law-abiding is simply based on the title "illegal" rather than the relationship and connection with the community emphasized in its cited authority. 273 To clarify the Fourth Circuit's incorrect analysis: the court first relied on an expanded interpretation of Heller, then focused on the Heller language of law-abiding citizens to interpret "the people" in the Second 266 Id. Id. at 980. 270 Id. at 979. 271 Id. at 980.
272
See id. at 979 (emphasizing that the Second Amendment is not tied to individuals declared as "unvirtuous citizens," those who are not a law-abiding member of the community, but fails to acknowledge a law-abiding non-citizen in its analysis). 273 Id. at 980. [Vol. 12:151 Amendment, to ultimately conclude that undocumented individuals are noncitizens and not law-abiding because they hold the title of "illegal." The Fourth Circuit's approach is a complete misapplication of precedent and incorrectly applies the historical traditions this country was founded upon. First, the "law-abiding citizenry" test the court applied did not consider the historical relationship between this class of individuals and the community. Specifically, it must be clear that "the founders' notion of citizenship was less rigid than ours, largely tied to the franchise, which itself was often based on little more than a period of residence and being a male with some capital." 274 Second, the position that undocumented individuals are not law-abiding simply based on a title is an improper categorization that is prejudicial and inaccurate. Because whatever the class or title illegal aliens hold and belong to, these individuals are surely a part of "the people," capable of being law-abiding, and must be afforded the protections of the Second Amendment.
Indeed, the text of the Constitution implies "protection[s] for [aliens] in the way it distinguishes citizens, persons, and the people." 275 This country has an established tradition of distinguishing between alien enemies from alien friends, 276 and the Fourth Circuit's focus on a classification title is improper with far-reaching implications on individuals who are already considered part of "the people" under our Constitution.
Disregarding the other circuits holdings that illegal aliens and non-U.S. citizens are not part of "the people," the Seventh Circuit is the only circuit to correctly interpret and extend the protections of the Second Amendment to this class of individuals. The key component of the decision was the criticism of the other circuits' unsound assumption that the terms "the people" and "citizen" must equate to the same meaning. This per se exclusion of illegal aliens and non-U.S. citizens cannot be justified by Supreme Court precedent and the historical traditions of this country. Also, the Seventh Circuit did not engage in an overly broad interpretation of Heller and rebuked the notion of a citizenry only Second Amendment right. The primary flaw in each of these earlier circuits is the fact that each court selected indistinct parts of the Heller opinion to justify their positions. When in fact, looking at the Heller opinion as a whole, other language of the decision actually supports the opposite result. Specifically, Heller recognized the similarities of the phrase "the people" found in the Second Amendment and the First and Fourth Amendments, which suggests that the identical phrasing must be interpreted the same throughout. 277 Indeed, nothing suggests that our framers intended this entitlement to be a citizen only pre-existing right.
The Meza-Rodriguez court also correctly respected the fact that the term "citizen" appears in other distinct parts of the Constitution compared to "the people" within the Bill of Rights. Therefore, these terms must not be treated as synonymous when each term has been distinctly used in different clauses of the Constitution. 278 The distinct uses of the terms "citizens" and "non-citizens" is "constitutionally important in no less than [eleven] instances in a political document noted for its brevity."
279 These distinct uses suggest that the extension of the Bill of Rights was to reach further than the ordinary citizen. Specifically, the Bill of Rights makes no mention of "citizen" and focuses on the broader terms of "people" and "persons." 280 The framers' conscious avoidance to not encompass the term "citizen" in the Bill of Rights must be interpreted that the drafters conveyed a purpose to extend these rights to a broader class of individuals. 281 Furthermore, there is wide-spread criticism related to the case-by-case analysis courts may undergo to apply the substantial connections test; however, this criticism remains unanswered as the Supreme Court has only once attempted to define "the people" within the Bill of Rights. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Verdugo-Urquidez, declared that the "precise contours" of the test remain unclear and criticized the interchangeable references of "sufficient connections," "substantial connections," and "accepting societal obligations" when applying these tests to make a determination of whether an illegal alien or a non-U.S. citizen is part of "the people." 282 Although courts will continue to be confronted with these difficult questions, they must recognize that the Supreme Court has established precedent, one that was textually incorporated in Heller, to interpret the identical phrasing of "the people" within the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments the same way. Courts must respect the fact that Verdugo-Urquidez addressed the specific question of defining "the people" and observed the principles of fundamental fairness. Specifically, the Bill See Cole, supra note 255, at 368 (writing, " [b] ecause the Constitution expressly limits to citizens only the rights to vote and to run for federal elective office, equality between non-nationals and citizens would appear to be the constitutional rule"). Moore, supra note 12, at 806. 281 Id. Bill of Rights.
288 Therefore, the Second Amendment right to bear arms must not be stripped away based on erroneous interpretations of Heller dicta. 289 The opposing circuits' decisions require considerable revision because precedent and historical traditions clearly exemplify that gun ownership is not connected to citizenship status. 290 With the tragic events and the related gun debate, Congress may choose to enact reasonable restrictions upon these individuals. However, the restrictions must undergo a strict analysis of the right at issue and the "prohibitions which that right has long accommodated." 291 The Second Amendment's individual right discussion raises tensions, and even contradictions, but non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens have developed deeply ingrained ties and are entitled to constitutional protections. 292 These cases are bigger than the mere possession of a gun, they are about fundamental fairness for those who are protected by the Bill of Rights.
Depriving a class of individuals of a fundamental right, based on an overly broad extension of dicta, warrants considerable reconsideration because non-U.S. Citizens and illegal aliens "are protected by the nation's core foundational and governing document." 293 These individuals must be able to utilize their right to bear arms consistent with the original political understanding of the Second Amendment, to protect and maintain the integrity of this nation. 294 Beginning with the founding of this country, non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens have developed and maintained substantial connections with this country, but often fail to obtain the title of "legal" or "citizen." The title of "citizen" is the most cherished and proudest accomplishment of millions of immigrants who enter this country. However, the title of U.S. citizen should not be the centerpiece for their inclusion to the Second Amendment.
The specific identity of "the people" within the Second Amendment has yet to be addressed by the Supreme Court; however, with reliance on decisions of the Court, the constitutional phrase "the people" does not only extend to citizens, but history and precedent clearly incorporates illegal aliens and non-U.S. citizens as part of "the people" of this country. 295 "cycle of citizen paranoia and alien fear" will continue to plague these unauthorized individuals and infringes on their essential right to protect themselves and family. 296 We must accept that our country has always and will continue to afford the people within our borders the protections of the United States Constitution.
(2003) (writing, "History strongly suggests that the use of the word "people" . . . was not in any way intended to exclude noncitizens from the rights safeguarded therein").
